Author: Richard

Freedom of Speech, Contrary Opinion and the Engineer

A version of this article first appeared in the August 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

I always thought the concept of freedom of speech was non political. I thought it was essential for a healthy society in the same way it is essential for a healthy organization.

It is my assessment that the politicization of the concept of freedom of speech is a bid for power in the present that will cause a decline in the long term health of society. Just like a restriction on discussion and communication in an organization will cause a decline in the health of the organization.

I have worked on two programs at two different OEMs where both the organizational chart and the schedule were secret and where meetings were shut down for speaking the truth. These programs both failed. One of the OEMs has gone through at least one bankruptcy and at the other the program was cancelled, the company was reorganized and has since been sold.

I am sure we have all worked in companies where political expediency is valued above commercial or technical excellence. We all know how painful it is to bend your psyche to fit into a warped notion of ‘common sense’ and live that reality every day.
The low cost purchase of expediency in the present for the long term cost of dysfunction, high staff turnover and eventual failure.

Apparently this culture is now deemed a good way forward for society as a whole. Companies that are run along these philosophical lines can go bankrupt and be replaced with a better functioning alternative. What happens when the society you live in elects to follow this path? What kind of philosophical, moral bankruptcy will result? And what will replace the society once it has been broken beyond repair?

It is clearly a better alternative to do what you can to save both the dysfunctional organization and, I would say essential, to save the dysfunctional society.

So what steps can you take to make a positive difference inside a dysfunctional organization and how does this relate to how to improve society?

1. Personal: Never compromise your personal integrity. If it feels wrong, if you are telling a lie or if you are hiding any truth you need to stop. Always tell the truth.  A good project manager once told me “if you are in a meeting and you are not comfortable with everything you discuss being on the front page of tomorrow’s newspaper you are doing something wrong”.

2. Emotional: Never lose your temper. No matter how much pressure you are under or how unpleasant your professional life may be always remain courteous and calm. Shouting does not win arguments and a smile and a shared joke puts people in the frame of mind to compromise and be flexible.

3. Professional: Be the best you can at what you do and share your skills and knowledge as widely as possible. Do not be selfish – share credit and accept blame. When someone corrects you accept it with gratitude – no matter what the intent of criticism is, it can make you better at what you do – use it.

The three points above are the things that I learnt from my own mistakes and missteps and while following them can be hard, not following them will generate a much worse result in the long term, both for yourself and others.

These points are good to apply in any industry. In engineering where bad designs, poor decisions and errors can cost lives I see them as essential. If I catch an engineer in a lie, or trying to hide an unpleasant truth they are a financial and ethical liability and their value as an engineer is effectively zero.

These are the standards that I use to judge myself and the people in my industry.

These personal standards rely on freedom of speech for me and freedom of speech for everyone else, no matter how much I may want to avoid what they have to say.

If we select to live in a culture that allows the suppression of ideas that we do not agree with, that are unpopular or even just wrong, where does that leave the free inquiry and unrestricted comment that are essential to the fields of engineering and science?

Organizations that cannot accept these standards of inquiry and criticism are dysfunctional. And if the application of these standards in society are not acceptable then society will become dysfunctional.

The way to reform a dysfunctional organization is the application of these standards, especially when they are the most difficult to apply.

The same is true of society, where the truth, or even just your opinion is least palatable, it is most important that it is spoken.

It is only through the exposure to contrary opinions that you learn to formulate the reason and logic behind your own positions. It is the only way that you find out that you are wrong. Free speech is what keeps us all from living in ignorance.

It is essential that we engineers maintain our ethical standards regardless of the short term consequences. How else do you live with yourself?

UAS Certification and what you can do about it

A version of this article first appeared in the August 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

We are working with several companies and organizations on regulatory compliance for both designing and operating unmanned aerial vehicles, both above and below the 55lb weight limit.

There are several things that immediately become apparent

  1. If you want to develop a UAS greater than a 55lb gross weight without a military or government customer, forget about it,
  2. There is a lot of demand and many commercial applications for heavier UAVs,
  3. Regulators are not psychic and have problems both formulating the regulations and recognizing the urgency of developing the regulations,
  4. Connecting with the regulators to help develop new regulations for development and operation is difficult. They are as busy as anyone else and have their own priorities. There is a sense of the importance but there is little leadership.

As I wrote in the last new letter, when it comes to government funding, there is a worry that the larger companies may monopolize this regulatory development process as well. Not that they would formulate any regulation with the intention of harming the smaller developers, but they have a certain way of doing things that involve large budgets and they will advocate for what they know. And that will involve large budgets.

From what I have seen first hand and from the experience of other consultants, some of the new companies in this space do not understand the certification process and how the regulations will profoundly affect their design process and the chance of success of their product in the market. We have started to work with a client who is very aware of these issues and have educated themselves well – regulatory issues are a significant focus for the initial phase of the project. If you can’t get the product past the regulator you will have zero sales.

And the companies who do understand the issue have problems getting their voices heard.

There are therefore two critical aspects that the industry has to achieve:

  • Focusing the regulator on the task
  • Getting a seat at the table and your voice heard.

This is a field where the technology is moving forward at an ever increasing pace and the regulator is barely out of the starting blocks.

If we all make more attempts to reach out to our local certification or regulatory body it can only help. There are several things you can do

  1. Find out who the individual responsible for UAS regulations is at local and national levels.
  2. Try and connect with them on linkedin, send them an email.
  3. If there are meetings or discussion schedules on this issue, try and get an invite. If you can’t get an invite make sure you get sent a copy of the minutes.
  4. Be polite, professional, enthusiastic and supportive. The regulator has a heavy responsibility to ensure public safety, but they also need the best information from all the stakeholders and they have to foster an environment conducive to innovation as well.

Give your time and energy for free and help as much as you can.

Brexit, Big Fish and the UK Aircraft Industry

A version of this article first appeared in the July 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here
In the last couple of years there have been a number of new aircraft projects in the UK. I Have been involved with some of them and it has been interesting to see the progress and reactions.
The new startup companies complain that while there is public funding or other types of assistance available (innovation centers co funded by the larger corporations in the industry such as Rolls Royce Aero Engines and Airbus) there is a freezing out of startup companies in favor of internal projects within the two giants in the UK.

Of course you would expect this. Little Billy Startup has little to no political sway compared to the established players. So when it comes down to the final decision it does not matter how good your design or business plan is, you’re just not in with the in-crowd.

You can see this in the UK. Rolls Royce has come up with a VTOL urban mobility design concept. It looks like around 20 other VTOL design concepts and has the same likelihood of success.

Rolls Royce have never proposed an aircraft program before. They have not issued an aircraft concept. Why now? Why are they competing with a bunch of startups in a field with a low probability of eventual success?
Do they plan to be the first to market? Do they see themselves as the post brexit UK aerospace leader? Is this just a case of keeping up with everyone else? Or is it a route through to public money meant for innovative startups?

The public should be worried as traditionally the market monopoly position of companies is used as a boogeyman to justify blocking mergers and acquisitions. An equal problem, but one that is largely ignored is the monopoly over public money. The more new companies depend on public money to get off the ground and overcome the unavoidable statutory product and corporate costs the more critical this becomes.

Mergers and corporate consolidation create this problem, as public money that is meant to promote innovation and technical risk ends up covering the day to day expenses of inefficient industry giants.

One of the most egregious cases of this is Bombardier in Canada (although I am sure you all have your own favorite). No one is really sure how much public money that they have received at the federal and provincial level in the form of cash gifts, grants, loans and subsidies. But the ones that I have counted in recent years come to over $1bn per year. I am sure it is impossible to calculate the total amount but it is significantly over this number.

This keeps a lot of people employed – which is a good thing. But what is the opportunity cost?

For the same money you could give 1000 technology startups a grant of $1m each. Imagine the innovation you would be fostering if you did that? How many ‘Bombardiers’ could Canada create with that approach? Well, hopefully not ‘Bombardiers’ that need $1Bn per year just to get by – but you know what I mean
Right now Canada has one – and it is very expensive.

So the UK as a newly independent nation (Theresa May notwithstanding) has a choice to make with it’s public funds. It can follow the Canadian model, it can reward inefficiency and established corporations or it can actually help cover the downside risk of innovative start up companies.

From what I have seen from my contacts and clients in the UK, it looks like it is business as usual. Just the process of applying for funding from these pots of public money is so onerous that many companies do not even try.

A project run by a good friend of mine was all ready to get approval for a substantial government grant. They had got top marks from all of the adjudicators and had ticked every box. Two days before the formal announcement of the award they got a call that things weren’t actually so cut and dried and that they should not assume that the grant will be awarded.

Another project we are working with are looking at getting space in an innovation center funded by Government and large industry partners. But this is in doubt because they may be judged as competing with one of the giant industry partners involved in the funding.

In a society where taxes are high and success, in a large part, depends on getting some of those taxes back in the form of a government grant, the monopoly that we allow large companies over this process is just as negative as a monopoly over the market. Maybe more so, as the only way the market can be bought is by providing additional value to the actual customers. In order to monopolize government grants you just have to lean on your local or national politician – a much simpler and less expensive process.

So with the large players being a big fish in a much smaller post-brexit pond where does that leave the little fish?

Lost in Sweden

A version of this article first appeared in the July 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

One of my favourite aircraft is the Saab 35 Draken which was a groundbreaking Swedish aircraft manufactured in the 1950’s and 60’s. It remained in service until the late 90’s with the Danish and Swedish air forces.

We have spent the last week of June with my wife’s parents in beautiful Sweden in a small town called Simrishamn. By chance there is a small museum just 5 minutes away from Simrishamn with a collection of Draken aircraft (http://www.osterlensflygmuseum.se/index.php) . The owner is an ‘amateur’ collector of aircraft (he has a real job during the week) and takes people on tours of his collection on Sundays by appointment.

Saab 35 Draken

He is far from being amateurish though, and his knowledge of Saab military aircraft programs is comprehensive. For any aircraft aficionado visiting the South East of Sweden I can recommend this as a great way to spend a Sunday afternoon.
He has about 10 Saab Drakens, 2 Saab Lansens, a Saab Viggen a De Havilland Dove, a Bell Huey many different vintage jet engines, aircraft ejection seats, flight suits, helmets and an astonishing array of aircraft miscellania. His collection is better than many established museums and his enthusiasm is infectious.

You can call the museum to make an appointment: 0701-122689. Remember to make a generous voluntary contribution, there is no set charge for viewing the collection and he is self supporting.

The Abbott Aerospace SEZC Ltd Scholarship Fund

A version of this article first appeared in the July 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

We have formally established our scholarship fund with the University College of the Cayman Islands.

The fund is targeted at students who have not qualified for any other award, who have enthusiasm and ability but may struggle academically.

For many technically minded people the classroom is not the best environment to shine and we want to support those students. We will be making multiple awards each semester and successful students will be awarded with a credit to their university account that can be redeemed against textbooks at the university bookstore. For more information or to get an application form you can contact me at [email protected]

Cayman Islands UAV Test Cell

A version of this article first appeared in the July 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

We have been invited to participate in a working group in the Cayman Islands to examine using the airport at Cayman Brac as a unrestricted UAV test cell.

Over the last year, as we have had more involvement in UAV programs the need for a UAV test range with minimal restrictions has become more obvious and urgent. We have had reports of fees charged up to $10,000 per day and severe envelope limitations that make it impossible for developers to fully realize the potential of their products.

I am hoping we can get the policies and procedures in place over the next few months to make this a reality. If you are interested in bringing your UAV to the Cayman Islands let me know ([email protected]). The more interest we generate the greater the enthusiasm will be from the island authorities and the quicker we can make this happen.

If you have a UAV to test why wouldn’t you test it in a tropical paradise, at a low price with next to no restrictions? Trust me – cocktails do actually taste better when you are sat on a white sand beach looking out over a turquoise ocean, palm fronds rustling gently in the breeze…….

Update: Initial discussions have begun with the Cayman Islands Civil Aviation Authority and in a few months we will be looking for industrial partners to join a consultation process to develop the standard operating procedures for UAV operators in the test cell.

Boeing and Embraer – The cost of doing business where you want to live

A version of this article first appeared in the July 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

I was asked this question this month “Where would you certify an aircraft if you had a choice?”. My answer was instinctively “Brazil”.

We have done studies to determine what factors make aircraft programs successful. In order to do this you have to define your measure of success and then you have to go hunting for metrics that inform your method and reveal the truth.

We use project level profitability as a measure of success. I.e. does a project manage to payback all of the costs of development and all the ongoing costs of unit production – project break-even. Beyond break-even does the project generate a profit and how does that profit relate to the investment required to bring the product to market.

To the outsider this can all be dreadfully boring, but to those of us wrapped up in the industry it can reveal some intriguing insights why programs succeed or fail. This information then may then give us the knowledge to help significantly increase the chance of success of a program.

The success of a program affects thousands of people – everyone working on the program and all of their families. Supplier companies, their employees and their families. When a program gets it very wrong not only are the investors out of pocket but the lives of thousands of people can be negatively affected.

There is no malice in programs that fail, there is also usually no lack of technical competence but there is a lack of asking the right questions and recognizing the right answers

So – how does all this relate to the original question “Where would you certify an aircraft if you had a choice?”.

This is an example of a project asking exactly the right question.

We categorize risks into 3 categories – technological, certification and market. There are other risks, supply chain, liability, etc, but all of those can be managed. Technology, certification and the market are the areas of an aircraft program that can present intractable problems that may be impossible to solve.

Of these ‘Big Three’, certification and the market at the two risks outside of the companies direct control. By that, I mean that the company can choose a technological basis for their product and once chosen that technology will not stop working – the technology is going to work in the same manner that it worked when you selected and developed it. Physics is reliable.

The market is fickle. Designs and product features can fall in and out of fashion. Focus groups may not represent the wider market trends and the economy and the buying power of your potential customers is in constant flux.

Certification regulations are subject to change, they can become less onerous or more onerous. The people responsible for interpreting the regulations change, some are good and some are ‘less good’. This is out of the control of the company.

It is reasonable to say that a company has no control of the market or the economy. You just have to do your best, hedge your bets the best you can and appeal to the largest market possible.

What can the company do to influence and minimize the risks and costs of the certification process?

In our study we examined 25 ‘high end’ part 23 aircraft projects from the last 30 years. We found that when their development costs are normalized for inflation the yearly ‘burn rate’ in development and certification has a surprisingly small scatter.

There are some outliers – the Eclipse 500 program had an average yearly burn rate over 5 times the average burn rate and 4 times the standard deviation.

In 2018 US dollars the average yearly development and certification spending rate of these 25 programs was US$50M.

(when two outliers of the 25 projects examined are removed the average yearly spend drops to US$35M per year)

Ignoring outliers it is accurate to state that the yearly spend rate of a program does not affect the success of the program.

When you examine program duration the critical metric for success is clearer (although not universal).

The program duration for the 25 programs examined range from 4 to 16 years. Using the limited data I have quoted so far this reveals that the lower limit program cost in 2018 US Dollars is going to be around US$200M and the higher limit will be US$800M.

This factor 4 difference can be influenced by a number of factors – one of the factors that significantly influence program duration is certification. The program duration is also influenced by the certification interface and process management competence of the company. This specific competence of the company and the attitude of the certification authority can combine into a perfect storm of schedule extensions.

In a perfect world where the regulations are universal and harmonized across international boundaries it should not matter where you choose to certify your aircraft.

The world is not perfect and even within national borders there are large differences in how regional offices approach certification and this can significantly influence the success of a program.

Everyone has a comfort zone – including the staff at the FAA (and every other certification authority in the world). You create very high financial risk trying to certify a part 29 rotorcraft using a local ACO (Aircraft Certification Office) that has predominantly worked with fixed wing LSA aircraft.

When an FAA/EASA/CAA (fill in the blank…) employee is operating outside their personal/professional comfort zone are they more or less likely to make a finding of compliance for your project? You know the answer to that question.

From our study, based on our criteria and the assumptions we have made, there are four successful part 23 companies that produce high performance aircraft. Cessna, Cirrus, Embraer and Pilatus and for all of 25 projects reviewed only 4 were found to meet our criteria of success.

Note: We omitted some companies and projects from the study due to lack of data, among these omitted companies and projects were Beech and Diamond Aircraft.

These companies are successful because of a number of critical factors. They design and develop great aircraft and they work with their local certification representatives to minimize the duration of the certification program.

So within the US, for larger part 23 programs, considering only certification cost as a critical factor, you would select the Wichita or the Chicago ACO to work with.

Internationally you would consider Brazil or Switzerland.

As Embraer are the only company of all companies examined with two projects that display good success indices (the Phenom 100 and the Phenom 300), ignoring all other factors, Brazil would be our certification jurisdiction of choice.

Both of the Phenom jet projects took less than 3 years to complete, the shortest programs out of all the programs we studied. This is due to the high level of competence of the development program management and the relatively small additional burden imposed by local certification authority.

Most aircraft projects are located where the initial development team is located or where a region offers the most financial incentive to locate the manufacturing.

Our advice is to locate the organization in a jurisdiction where the certification authority has a track record of enabling a return on investment.

This brings us back around to the title of the article. Boeing and Embraer.

Boeing’s ‘partnership’ with Embraer may partly be one-upmanship on Airbus and Bombardier. It may be sensible consolidation and a way to protect the market share they have of the larger aircraft sizes. It may be to save on manufacturing cost by outsourcing to a supplier/partner with clearly demonstrated competence.

Or it just may be a path for Boeing to certify new aircraft programs through a different certification authority. A certification authority that have facilitated Embraers extraordinary growth while maintaining appropriate product safety levels.

What do you think? Will Boeing take the plunge and conduct a type certification program outside of the US?

On a related note. Many of the new Aerial Urban Mobility projects are based in California. The Los Angeles ACO do not have favorable history of assisting and supporting companies certify new types of civil aircraft. We would advise all of these projects to seek new locations and plan on working with FAA ACOs that will maximise their chance of success by minimizing program duration and therefore program cost.

Current View (June 2018) of the General Aviation Market

A version of this article first appeared in the June 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

This month I have been doing some work on the manned aerospace market. For those of us with an involvement in the market it is interesting to go through the numbers. There is good data available on the North American market from GAMA and the FAA as well as other online sources.

The North American Market is not predicted to experience dramatic growth over the next two decades, however there will be significant end of life replacement in the existing private and commercial aircraft fleet.

In commercial aviation the North American (N.A.) commercial aircraft expenditure is expected to grow at a CAGR of 0.6%, the Asia Pacific region commercial aircraft expenditure is expected to grow at a CAGR of 6.6% – 11 times greater than N. A., Latin America and the Caribbean a CAGR of 7.3% – 12 times greater than N.A

Global MRO Expenditure Growth 2015-2025 (Doan, 2015)

The values are indicative of the overall growth of the economies.

2016 World Economic Growth (FAA-2017, 2017)

It is reasonable to assume that the general aviation sectors will grow in line with both the general economic growth and the growth in MRO aircraft expenditure.

Comparison of Other Countries to the United States

Registered GA Aircraft per Million Population, source data from (Hu, 2015)

General aircraft ownership per population is very high in the traditional developed economies. This is the result of multiple factors: Wealth, Culture, Level of Education, Available Infrastructure, Regulations. It is reasonable to assume that over time the level of general aviation aircraft ownership in developing nations will significantly increase.

Some individual countries/regions are examined below:

India

In India between 1990 and 2015 the number of business aircraft grew from 41 to 487, a tenfold increase. Of this growth 245 aircraft were helicopters and 100 aircraft were turbo props.  (Martin Consulting, 2016). In the same report several growth rates for the India business aviation market are given, the median case is 7% CAGR. This results in an additional 857 aircraft predicted to join the business aviation fleet in India by 2025

China

In 2016 China had 2185 registered general aviation aircraft, by 2020 China plans to have 5000 registered general aviation aircraft. (Brent & Yuan, 2017).

Fixed Wing Market

Historical Data


General Aviation Sales Figures 1995 to 2017 (GAMA-2017, 2017)

The Piston Aircraft and LSA Fixed Wing Market

It should be noted that the market for piston aircraft was significantly attenuated in the financial crisis of 2008 and the number of aircraft shipped has not recovered to pre 2008 numbers. However the US$ billing amount in the piston aircraft segment has recovered to 76% of the total billing amount.

Piston Aircraft Billings US$ 1994-2017 (GAMA-2017, 2017)

It should be noted that the average unit price for a piston engine aircraft has been rising at a near constant rate of $20,000 per year over the range of the available data – from around $250,000 per unit to $650,000 per unit between 1994 and 2017.

To take some individual data points, 2 US ‘recently’ (within the last 20 years) certified 4 seat piston aircraft:

Cirrus SR22 certified in 2000, initial price $276,600, Current price: $540,000

Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the cumulative rate of inflation between 2001 and 2018 would result in a price increase from $276,600 to $395,780.

The price of a basic Cirrus SR22 has increased by $144,000 over the rate of inflation

Diamond DA40 certified in 2000, initial price $179,900, Current price: $459,800

Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the cumulative rate of inflation between 2001 and 2018 would result in a price increase from $179,900 to $254,507.

The price of a basic Diamond DA40 has increased by $200,000 over the rate of inflation.

There are many reasons for the relatively large increase in real price of new general aviation aircraft over time:

  1.       The original price of the aircraft was underestimated and the initial production run for the original orders was done at little to negative profit. After the original orders were fulfilled the price was increased to create or increase profitability.
  2.       There was an increase in the cost of doing business (raw materials, labor, regulations) over and above the rate of inflation.
  3.       There was a large reduction in volume of sales and a price increase was necessary to cope with the loss of ‘economies of scale’, however the rate of price increase has remained relatively constant through the large reduction in market size in 2008.

Piston Aircraft Average Unit Price 1994-2017

Conclusion on the Piston Aircraft Market

  • The large used aircraft market, combined with higher prices for new aircraft, is largely responsible for the reduction in new piston aircraft sales.
  • The increase in the price of new piston aircraft is partially responsible for the interest in used aircraft.
  • To compete in the piston aircraft market the aircraft manufacturer must present a value proposition to the purchaser better than the current aircraft in the market.

The Turbo-Prop Aircraft General Aviation Fixed Wing Market

In contrast to the piston engine market the general aviation turboprop market was minimally affected by the 2008 financial crisis.

Turboprop Billings 1994-2017 (GAMA-2017, 2017)

And the overall billing value for the Turboprop market shows gradual ‘table’ growth over the period for which data exists.

The turboprop unit price shows a slight downward trend over time. The unit price is still between US$2,500,000 and US$3,000,000.

Turboprop Aircraft Average Unit Price 1994-2017 (GAMA-2017, 2017)

In comparison to the piston aircraft market, steady growth over time with a small downward trend in unit price is to be expected in a utilitarian product based on mature technology. It also shows that the original (pre 2008) pricing for turboprop aircraft was likely more realistic compared to piston aircraft.

Projected Data

The FAA predicts a reduction in the US general aviation fleet size. This does not mean that there is not a growing market for new aircraft. The average age of the general aviation fleet in the US is 46 years for single engine piston aircraft and 43 years for twin engine piston aircraft, for turboprop aircraft it is 28 years (GAMA-2017, 2017). Over the next 20 years a significant proportion of these aircraft will have to be replaced.

General Aviation Fleet Size Prediction 2007-2037 (FAA-2017, 2017)

Note that the value of the Light Sport Aviation (LSA) segment is projected to grow over the next 20 years as is the fixed wing turbine and rotorcraft segments.

From the available data the North American general aviation market appears to be saturated and sales are mostly from fleet replacement. In contrast the rest of the world (excluding Europe and Australia) are likely to experience a growth in general aviation at least in line with their predicted economic growth – and that could be very good news.

How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Process

A version of this article first appeared in the January 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

I have been working with a company just getting to the end of their prototype design phase. They have yet to fly one of the prototypes and their engineering team is working very hard to release the final engineering definition to support the prototype build to flight program.

Once this has been done the expectation is that they will be able to move immediately into certification design, release and manufacture.

  • The company has not developed a certifiable production design before.
  • Most of the managers come from large companies.

These two aspects can combine to cause significant problems.

Most engineers and managers who are accustomed to a large company environment are not fully aware of all of the processes that have been devised and implemented that contribute to the smooth running of engineering, manufacturing, procurement, quality, etc.

Most of them are aware of some of the processes, but like everybody – you don’t know what you don’t know.

What almost all of them are unaware of is the problem that arise when you go through the development and certification processes of an aircraft product with insufficient, immature or non-existent engineering standards and processes.

Engineering processes have an image problem. What kind of engineer would want to work on dull process issues when you can be devising cool looking things that fly?

Imagine a modern car engine if you turned off the software control system, or a computer without an operating system.

It looks like it should work but is doesn’t. Many startup companies spend a vast amount of money discovering this over a number of years.

To Quote Sun Tzu – “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat”.

Returning to our startup company in this example. They have a great engineering team and experienced engineering leadership.

They have almost no engineering standards or processes and those that they have are not implemented or enforced.

Standards and Processes are an important component of engineering management strategy. They are tools that channel engineers efforts into products that are certifiable, manufacturable, affordable and sensible.

In the absence of Standards and Processes it is only by chance that you will end up with a good product. In a product as complex as an aircraft there is practically zero chance that the integrated product will be any good at all.

If you create standards and fail to promulgate and enforce them, it is the same as having no standards. An experience I had a few years ago with a client comes to mind. They were having trouble with consistent drawing standards as they were using different contract engineering groups to produce the type design drawing set. I wrote a drafting standards manual for them (based on the excellent NASA drafting standards manual). We got it checked and approved – however, the approver changed the title of the document from “Drawing Standards” to “Drawing Guidelines”. Standards are mandatory, Guidelines are optional.

I assume you can guess the outcome; there was no increase in drawing standards, it was as if the document had never been written.

So, there is a set of problems associated with an absence of process, there is another set of problems caused by over definition of engineering processes

Company standards and processes are like laws – they have to be drafted and approved, there is an enforcement cost and a restriction of freedom.

We have worked with several established OEMs that have processes which are excessive and burdensome and greatly increase the cost of product development.

And just like a government department, once you establish a department inside a company for processes and standard development, with the best will in the world, it will justify its own existence and importance by ever more important and burdensome processes.

So leave the process development and maintenance in the hands of the senior engineers and not a group of process specialists.

Just make sure you hire the right senior engineers……..

The creation of even a simple engineering system takes time and and also a considerable effort to introduce to a team. It requires a rigorous level of check and enforcement.

It requires technical leads who can say no and engineers who can handle rejection.

A company has to decide what it need to control in order to develop a reliable, cost effective, certifiable product. These may include

  • Design Standards
  • Drawing Standards
  • Stress Methods
  • Approved Hardware
  • Approved Materials
  • Approved Processes
  • Approved Means of Inspection
  • Reporting Standards
  • Release and Approval Processes
  • Change Processes
  • CAD System Processes
  • CAD Creation Standards

All of these standards are informed by the compliance plan – that which you know to be certifiable and the means that you will use to demonstrate compliance.

Take a moment to think about the processes where you work – do they do harm by being over restrictive or by giving too much freedom? Do they help by focusing the teams on the right thing to do? Can they be improved?

Finite Element Models – Keep it Simple, Stupid

A version of this article first appeared in the February 2018 edition of our free newsletter, to subscribe click here

On one of our projects we have been analysing the major sub assemblies using sub assembly finite element models. Once the general design is frozen we will bring all these models together to create the global finite element model.

At that point we can carry out the loads analysis to develop the full aircraft balanced load cases, apply those loads to the aircraft model and run the cases for our final checks on the design.

There is always time pressure to get these tasks done so when we created the sub assembly models (Wing, Horizontal stabilizer, Vertical Tail) we did not take the time to idealize the structure to the correct level.

What I mean by this is modelled the main structural composite ‘boxes’ using a good idealization; laminate elements about 2in square. When it came to the attachment fittings for the control surfaces, flap and the attachment to the supporting structure we meshed those quickly using solid elements.

At the time we did this we knew that when we brought all the sub assembly models together to create the global finite element model we may have an issue with the total number of nodes and elements.

But time was paramount and we put this from our minds.

We are now working on the aircraft (or global) finite element model and when we bring in the sub assembly models we created previously we have over 700,000 nodes. For the type of aircraft and project this is and considering that we will likely end up running over 100 cases on the global model we are creating a data processing and data management headache.

Bear in mind that we are doing all of the finite element modelling, load analysis and stress analysis work with just two engineers.

As the global aircraft finite element model is our main analysis tool we need it to be quick to modify and re-run, we need speed when we post process data and we don’t need terabytes of data that we have to manage.

And this brought home the simulation truism that it is easy to modify a simple model to make it more complex but almost impossible to modify a complex model to make it more simple.

It is also true that it is easier to create a representative complex model than it is to create a representative simple model.

So now we have to go back and put the work in now to remodel areas of the structure to reduce complexity and still keep the model representative.

Maybe this does not add much additional extra cost (the original models were ‘quick’ to create anyway) but I hate the thought or redoing anything and we should have done it right first time around.

I am hoping we can limit the global finite element model to below 100,000 nodes. That will give us a model that we can run the basket of critical cases on in an hour or so and leave us with a set of data that won’t cause storage problems.

It will also makes it practical to run solutions other than just linear static on the global model.

The impacts of these aspects of modelling are difficult to account – the time and cost of dealing with excessive times to run model solutions and managing the data that complex models create is real but very difficult to quantify.

  • As a side note. About 10 years ago we were working on a part 25 program for a major OEM. They sent us the global FE model to run for the work we were doing for them. We thought we could not get it to run as the solver seemed to ‘hang’ during the solution. We were running the model on a high end Dell workstation with 26GB of RAM. We discussed this with the client and they informed us that the model takes 4 to 5 days to run. It did take that long to run and produced enormous amounts of data. That work package inevitably took far longer to complete than we had planned.

The cost to simplify the global model is something that we do have to explain to the client, it is evident and is clearly accounted for – but the savings created by simplifying the model, which are large, are impossible to accurately quantify.

These problems occur because the client or manager cannot be aware of all the the nuances of the analysis work that is done. It is always difficult to justify guaranteed cost now compared to the potential for much greater additional cost later.